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The Monkey Laws and the Public
Schools: A Second Consumption?
Frederic S. Le Clercq*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As a national issue, the teaching of evolution in the public
schools appeared to have been put to rest with the celebrated Scopes
trial in Tennessee almost half a century ago.' When the Supreme
Court finally invalidated a state "antievolution" law in Epperson v.
Arkansas,' Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, seriously questioned whether the case presented a genuinely justiciable case or
controversy since the state had never made a single attempt to
enforce it for nearly forty years after passage.3 Evolution as a religiopolitical issue-fraught with all its potential for religious fragmen* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee; B.A., Univ. of So. Car.; M.A.,
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; LL.B., Duke University.
1. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). The Scopes trial has generated
a substantial amount of nonlegal literature and has become a part of American folklore. See
generally L. ALLEN, BRYAN AND DARROW AT DAYTON (1967); R. BRUMBAUGH, SIX TRIALS (1969);
W. CURTIS, FUNDAMENTALISM V. EVOLUrION AT DAYTON, TENNESSEE (1956); L. DECAMP, THE
GREAT MONKEY TRIAL (1968); R. GINGER, Six DAYS OR FOREVER? TENNESSEE V. JOHN THOMAS
SCOPES (1958); S. GRABSTEIN, MONKEY TRIAL (1960); J. LAWRENCE & R. LEE, INHERIT THE WIND
(1955); J. SCOPES & J. PRESLEY, CENTER OF THE STORM (1967); M. SETTLE, THE SCOPES TRIAL
(1972); J. TOMPKINS, D-DAYs AT DAYTON (1965).
2. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). In 1970, the Mississippi Supreme Court invalidated the Mississippi antievolution statute on the authority of Epperson. Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692 (Miss.
1970).
3. 393 U.S. at 109. A study published in 1942, however, revealed that fewer than half
of the high school biology teachers taught evolution as the principle underlying the development of all living things. COMM. ON TEACHING OF THE UNION OF AMERICAN BIOLOGICAL SOCIETIES,
THE TEACHING OF BIOLOGY IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS OF THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT OF RESULTS
FftOM A QUESTIONNAIRE (0. Riddle, F. Fitzpatrick & H. Glass ed. 1942). Nor had the situation
changed significantly in 1959. See Muller, One Hundred Years Without Darwinism Are
Enough, 19 THE HUMANIST 139 (1959). The Biological Sciences Curriculum Study, however,
funded by the National Science Foundation at the University of Colorado since 1960 has
ushered in a new breed of biology textbooks which
reflect the major innovations in teaching methods-process and inquiry-that revolutionized high school biology in the 1960's and are now penetrating the new elementary
school science curricula.
Aulie, The Doctrine of Special Creation, 34 AM. Bio. TEACHER 191, 192 (1972).
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tation and social discord-is now being revived and politicized by
various groups of religious fundamentalists who espouse a "creationist" position. 4 Creationists are making a determined effort to
replace the theory of evolution in public school science textbooks
with the doctrine of Divine or Biblical Creation, or its protean "scientific" counterpart, special or spontaneous creation. At the very
least, creationists hope to dilute the theory of evolution to the level
6f hypothesis or speculation and to win equal time for the doctrine
of special creation.
Recent events suggest that the creationist movement is both
potent and truly national. in scope. In California, the science curriculum guidelines for public schools were modified by a sympathetic
state board of education to accommodate the creationist position.'
4. The political base of the creationist movement is located in the various fundamentalist religious sects. Its leadership is often associated with fundamentalist sectarian educational
institutions such as Bob Jones University, Greenville, South Carolina; Concordia Lutheran
Junior College, Ann Arbor, Michigan; and David Lipscomb College, Nashville, Tennessee.
The Creationist Research Society of Ann Arbor, Michigan, founded in 1963, is the oldest
national creationist organization, aside from churches and educational institutions. It has 400
voting members, who must have at least a masters degree in some branch of science, and 1300
sustaining members who are "Christians who believe that the facts of science support the
revealed account of creation in the Bible." 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATxONS § 10, Religious
Organizations,at 937 (7th ed. 1972). The Society includes "the hard core of scientistcreationists who advocate the falsity of evolution and the truth of Genesis." 178 SCmNCE 726
(1972). Other major creationist groups include the Institute for Creation Research, a division
of Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California; the Creation-Science Research Center
of San Diego, California; the Bible Science Association of Caldwell, Idaho; and the American
Scientific Affiliation.
For additional background information on the creationist movement and its leadership
see Aulie, The Doctrine of Special Creation, 34 AM. Bio. TEACHER 191-200, 261-68 (1972);
Bresdesen, Anatomy of a Confrontation, 23 J. OF Am. Sci. AFFILIATION 146 (1971); Larsen,
California'sEvolution War: Should Genesis Get Equal Time, 87 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 251-53
(1970); Morris, Relation Between Institute for Creation Research and Other Creationist Organizations (undated pamphlet distributed by the Institute for Creation Research); Evolution
Slips Back a Notch in CaliforniaSchools, 14 MED. WORLD NEWS, Feb. 2, 1973, at 20-21; 178
SCIENCE 724-29 (1972); The National Observer, Dec. 30, 1972, at 6.
5. The California State Board of Education "reflects to some degree the pietism of Gov.
Ronald Reagan, who appointed all of its members." Evolution Slips Back a Notch in California Schools, 14 MED. WORLD NEWS, Feb. 2, 1973, at 20. Over the express disapproval of its
blue ribbon State Advisory Committee on Science Education, the California Board of Education approved inclusion of the following two paragraphs in its science curriculum guidelines:
All scientific evidence to date concerning the origin of life implies at least a dualism
or the necessity to use several theories to fully explain relationships between established
data points. This dualism is not unique to this study but is also appropriate in other
scientific disciplines, such as the physics of light.
While the Bible and other philosophic treatises also mention creation, science has
independently postulated the various theories of creation. Therefore, creation in scientific terms is not a religious or philosophic belief. Also note that creation and evolutionary theories are not necessarily mutual exclusives. Some of the scientific data (e.g., the
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Science textbooks for use in the public schools of California are
being edited to dilute passages on evolution,6 and creationists almost achieved express recognition of their beliefs in the science
texts.7 In Tennessee, a law has been passed that requires inclusion
of the Biblical account of creation in biology textbooks used in the
public schools." Similar legislation to require treatment of creationregular absence of transitional forms) may be best explained by a creation theory, while
other data (e.g., transmutation of species) substantiate a process of evolution.
CALIFORNIA STATE COMMrrTEE ON SCIENCE EDUCATION, SCIENCE FRAMEWORK FOR CALIFORNIA

ScHooLs 106 (1970).
6. Progress Reports from the Consulting Committee Charged with Editing Science
Textbooks with Regard to Origins to the members of the California State Board of Education,
Jan. 11, 1973, Feb. 8, 1973. The proposed changes generally were more conditional or qualified
than statements in present editions. Thus, in the memorandum of January 11, 1973, it was
recommended that a sentence which read: "Modern animals that are descendants of some
that lived in the Coal Age are salamanders, turtles, dragonflies, and cockroaches" be changed
to read: "Modern animals that seem to be direct descendants of .
The sentence,
"Meanwhile, about 400 million years ago, animals began to move from water to lqnd," was
recommended to read, "It is thought that about 400 million years. . . ." The words, "scientists think" were often reduced to read "most scientists think." Qualifications such as "according to evolutionary theory" were proposed for a number of statements. In the memorandum of February 11, 1973, 52 editorial changes were proposed for 13 science texts. Typical
proposed changes were insertions of statements such as: "Science cannot answer the question
of where the first matter and energy came from;" and "No one knows just how or when the
vertebrates first came into being."
7. On February 8,1973, the California State Board of Education voted 5 to 2 in favor
of inserting creation doctrine in science textbooks. The motion failed only because a majority
of six is required for action by the ten member board. One of the two "no" votes was cast by
Rev. David Hubbard, president of Fuller Theological Seminary in Pasadena, California, who
favors putting creation doctrine in science texts but thought that the time was too short to
make the creationist revisions in an adequate manner. Rev. Hubbard, therefore, preferred to
see the books edited "to make certain that evolution is stated as a theory rather than as a
fact." Los Angeles Times, Feb. 9, 1973, Pt. I, at 26, col. 1.
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-2008 (1972) as amended, Ch. 377, §§ 1-4, [1973] Tenn.
Pub. Acts 1152. The Tennessee law provides in pertinent part:
Any biology textbook used for teaching in the public schools, which expresses an
opinion of, or relates to a theory about origins or creation of man and his world shall be
prohibited from being used as a textbook in such system unless it specifically states that
it is a theory as to the origin and creation of man and his world and is not represented
to be scientific fact. Any textbook so used in the public education system which expresses an opinion or relates to a theory or theories shall give in the same text book and
under the same subject commensurate attention to, and an equal amount of emphasis
on, the origins and creation of man and his world as the same is recorded in other
theories, including, but not limited to, the Genesis account in the Bible. The provisions
of this Act shall not apply to use of any textbook now legally in use, until the beginning
of the school year of 1975-1976; provided, however, that the textbook requirements stated
above shall in no way diminish the duty of the state textbook commission to prepare a
list of approved standard editions of textbooks for use in the public schools of the state
as provided in this section. Each local school board may use textbooks or supplementary
material as approved by the State Board of Education to carry out the provisions of this
section. The teaching of all occult or satanical beliefs of human origin is expressly
excluded from this act.
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ist doctrine in science textbooks was also introduced in state legislatures in Colorado,9 Michigan,' 0 Washington," and Georgia.' 2 Additionally, some local school boards, such as the Columbus, Ohio,
Board of Education,", have passed resolutions to require inclusion
of the creationist position. In Texas, a creationist campaign won
important concessions from the state board of education,' 4 and active creationist campaigns are also being conducted in Louisiana,'5
Indiana,'" Florida,' 7 Illinois,' 8 Virginia,' 9 and Pennsylvania,20 among
other states. Creationists have threatened to seek relief from the
courts under the free exercise clause, although the first skirmish
resulted in dismissal for failure to state a claim.2 ' Intensified creationist efforts can be expected in state legislatures and before state
and local boards of education across the nation. A creationist press
has been organized to arouse the public and to supply the demand
for public school textbooks bearing a creationist imprimatur. Of
even greater significance is the possibility that national school textProvided however that the Holy Bible shall not be defined as a textbook, but is
hereby declared to be a reference work, and shall not be required to carry the disclaimer
above provided for textbooks.
9. H.R. Con. Res. 1011, Colo. State Assembly, Sess. (1972).
Sess. (Jan. 30-31, 1973).
10. S. 67, Mich. Leg.,
(Mar. 12, 1973).
11. H.R. 1021, Wash.
12. S. 276, Ga. Senate
(March , 1973).
(March 16, 1971).
13. Columbus, Ohio, Board of Education, Resolution No.
14. 178 SCIENCE 728-29 (1972).
15. Id. at 729.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Letter from Richard W. Thomas, Burbank, Illinois to Jerry Lightner, Exec. Sec.,
Nat'l Ass'n of Biology Teachers, Feb. 13, 1973. A Bible and Modem Science Seminar was
held February 24, 1973 in Oak Forest, Illinois at the Calvary Baptist Church on the topic
"Evolution: Fact or Fiction." Two of the three speakers in the all day program were faculty
members of the science department at Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina.
19. In the spring of 1972, J. T. Houk from Falls Church, Virginia, under the letterhead
of the Creation-Science Research Center memorialized all principals of public secondary
schools and state education officials in Virginia in a four page memorandum criticizing
biology textbooks on the Virginia approved list and urging consideration of creationist biology
texts. Letter from J.T. Houk to W. Wilkerson, Supt. of Schools for the State of Virginia,
undated.
20. Letter from Clyde M. Broadbelt, Downington, Pennsylvania to H. Wingerd, Supt.,
West Chester Area School Dist., West Chester, Pennsylvania, May 9, 1972.
21. Willoughby v. Steven, Civil No. 1574-72 (D.D.C., Aug. 25, 1972). In Willoughby the
plaintiff challenged financial grants made by the National Science Foundation to the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study (BSCS), a project to prepare biology textbooks for school
children, on the grounds that BSCS textbooks present the theory of evolution as "the only
reliable theory of the origin of man," a view which is "hostile to the religious beliefs of the
14, 16. In its dismissal order, the court declined to request the
plaintiff." Complaint, at
convening of a three-judge court because of the "insubstantiality of the alleged constitutional
issue proposed by the plaintiff." Dismissal order at 3, 7.
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book publishing companies will edit school textbooks to accommodate the creationist position.
Ultimately, the issues raised in the controversy over science
teaching and textbooks will probably have to be resolved in the
courts. Litigation in California has thus far been forestalled as a
result of a tenuous, and perhaps temporary, settlement. 2 Therefore,
it is probable that the issue will be litigated first in Tennessee,
which has enacted creationist legislation. This article will explore
the important and highly sensitive constitutional implications of
the science teaching and textbook controversy under the establishment, free exercise, and free speech clauses of the first amendment
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
II.

SCIENCE TEACHING, TEXTBOOKS, AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment,23 Justice Powell recently observed, present "some of the most
perplexing questions to come before this Court."24 The elusive,
meandering line that separates the secular from the sectarian in
American life cannot be defined with precision but is a "paradox
central to our scheme of liberty." ' Although there is consensus on
the broad contours of the controlling constitutional standards, the
application of general principles to particular factual situations
2
remains an exacting task. 1
The science teaching and textbook controversy, like many other
issues arising under the religion clauses of the first amendment, lies
2
in the tension between the establishment and free exercise clauses. 1
22. See notes 6 and 7 supra.
23. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
U.S. CONST. amend.
I. The Court has "decisively settled" and "repeatedly reaffirmed" the doctrine that the "First
Amendment's mandate. . . has been made wholly applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1963).
24. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, U.S.
....
93 S. Ct. 2955, 2959 (1973).
25. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 231. (Brennan, J., concurring).
26. This explains why the Court's decisions on cases arising under the establishment
and free exercise clauses have rarely been unanimous.
27. The general problem of conflict and accommodation between the two clauses was
emphasized in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 296-304 (Brennan, J., concurring). The
"interrelationship" of the establishment and free exercise clauses was first touched upon in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). More recently, the Court suggested that
the tension inevitably existing between the establishment and free exercise clauses is the
reason "our cases require the State to maintain an attitude of 'neutrality,' neither 'advancing'
nor 'inhibiting' religion." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, U.S. at -,
93 S. Ct. at 2973.
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The scientific community generally regards the doctrine of spontaneous or special creation as non-scientific and religious. 28 Under this
view, the inclusion of creationist doctrine in science classes amounts
to an establishment of religion proscribed by the first amendment.
State legislation or administrative regulations that require the
teaching of creation doctrine or its inclusion in textbooks also raise
substantial free exercise questions for many teachers and students.
Creationist leaders and fundamentalist parents, however, see
the issue from a quite different perspective. For them, present science teaching and textual materials that discuss evolution exclusively amount to an establishment of a "secular religion" and interfere with the free exercise of the revealed truths of fundamentalist
29
religion .
It is within this framework of diverse, competing values and
social interests that the delicate constitutional balance must be
struck between the usual presumption supporting legislative and
administrative action and the preferred place given first amendment freedoms.
A.

The Establishment Clause

Most of the establishment clause cases have addressed the relationship between religion and education. Among these precedents,
two general categories of cases may be identified-those dealing
with religious activities within the public schools,"0 and those concerning public aid in varying forms to sectarian educational institu28. See, e.g., Resolution of the Commission on Science Education of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (Oct. 13, 1972), THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES CURuCULUM STUDY NEWSLErrER No. 49, at 17 (1972).
29. See Houk letter, supra note 19, in which the writer contends that present science
teaching and teaching materials
[1] . . . create a deterrence of the belief structure of the religious child ....
[2] . . . [inculcate] the basic tenets of the established religion of secular humanism,
including the origin of man from lower forms of life, and the accidental origin of life on
this planet ....
[3] . . . implant in pupils' minds a preference for atheism or agnosticism, and reflect
unfavorably upon the bedrock reference material of religion and upon all religions and
upon particular creeds.
The Court has already considered and disagreed with the charge that unless "religious exercises are permitted a 'religion of secularism' is established in the schools." School Dist v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
30. E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (antievolutionary limitation on
public school study); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading in public
schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer reading in public schools); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) ("released time" from public education for religious education);
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (also a "released time" case).
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tions. 3 ' Certain controlling constitutional guidelines have also
emerged from the previous establishment clause litigation. 32 First,
the law or act in question must reflect a clearly secular legislative
purpose;33 secondly, it must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 4 and thirdly,
it must avoid excessive
3
government entanglement with religion.
1. Legislative Purpose.-To pass muster under the establishment clause, legislation or state action must be adequately supported by legitimate secular interests. This secular purpose alone,
however, will not immunize a law from further scrutiny if its primary effect still advances religion or causes excessive entanglements
between church and state. 6
In Epperson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held in 1963 that
state legislation cannot be justified by considerations of state policy
resting solely upon the religious views of some of its citizens and
invalidated the Arkansas antievolution statute because it was "clear
that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason
for existence."3 7 Although the Arkansas act38 was less explicit in
religious references than those of other states, 39 the Epperson Court
31. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, U.S. - 93
S. Ct. 2955 (1973) (maintenance, repair, and tuition reimbursement grants and income tax
deductions); Hunt v. McNair, U.S. ._. 93 S. Ct. 2868 (1973) (secular college facilities);
Sloan v. Lemon, U.S. _ 93 S. Ct. 2982 (1973) (tuition reimbursement) [hereinafter
cited as Lemon III; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (secular college facilities);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (teachers' salaries, textbooks, instructional materials) [hereinafter cited as Lemon 1]; Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 US. 1 (1947) (bus transportation).
32. Taken together, these standards, according to Justice Powell, amount to a "well
defined three-part test." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, U.S.
at _.
93 S. Ct. at 2965.
33. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
34. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 684-89 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
36. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
37. 393 U.S. at 107-08. The Supreme Court in establishing the legislative purpose of
the Arkansas antievolution law took judicial notice of newspaper advertisements and letters
to the editor. Id. at 108 n.16. See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967) where
the Court observed that it is proper to examine the constitutionality of state legislation "in
terms of its 'immediate objective,' its 'ultimate effect' and its 'historical context and the
conditions existing prior to its enactment' .... "
38. Act No. 1, Ark. Acts 1929, the text of which is reprinted in Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. at 99 n.3.
39. The original Tennessee antievolution law, Law of March 21, 1925, ch. 27 [1925]
Tenn. Acts (repealed 1967), had "candidly stated its purpose" of making it unlawful to teach
any theory that rejected the divine creation of man as stated in the Bible. Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 108-09. Compare ch. 377 [1973] Tenn. Acts 1152 (requiring that
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ruled that the purpose of the law was still the same-to suppress the
teaching of any theory that seemed to deny the divine creation of
man." The Court concluded that
Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality. Arkansas
did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and universities all
discussion of the origin of man. The law's effort was confined to an attempt to
blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical
account, literally read."'

The current drive to win equal time for creationist doctrine 42-in
lieu of the 1920's strategy to "blot out" evolution-may well have
been conceived as a response to Epperson. Although the equal time
argument has far more public appeal than the simple negativism
that the fundamentalist movement formerly exercised, one biologist
recently pointed out that the basic problem still remains: "religion
is not science. 4' 3 Luckily, creationists have not espoused the variety
of "religious neutrality" that would remove from the public school
classroom all discussion about the origin of man.44
The litany of such metaphysical concepts as religious neutrality
recited in Epperson are confusing and of little analytical or predictive value. The constitutional values that emerge from the case are
of much greater utility and durability. Eppersonsuggests that state
legislation should be strictly scrutinized to the extent that legislation advances religious rather than secular interests. Where the only
interests supporting legislation are religious or nonsecular, as in
Epperson, the presumption of invalidity should be conclusive. Another important constitutional value implicit in the decision is that
in public educational institutions no religious group should be allowed to blot out a segment of knowledge "deemed to conflict with
a particular religious doctrine."4 5 A fortiori, no religious group
should be permitted to compel the inclusion of a segment of its
particular religious doctrine in the public school curriculum."
biology textbooks discussing man's origin give "an equal amount of emphasis" on different
theories, including the Biblical account), amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-2008 (1972).
40. 393 U.S. at 109.
41. Id.
42. See notes 9-13 supra.
43.

Mayer, The Nineteenth Century Revisited, THE BIOLOGICAL

SCIENCES CURRICULUM

No. 49, at 12 (1972).
44. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 109 (dictum).
45. 393 U.S. at 103.
46. As the Court observed in Epperson, "the First Amendment does not permit the
State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions
of any religious sect or dogma." Id. at 106 (dictum). See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 505 (1952), cited with approval in Epperson, where Mr. Justice Clark stated that
STUDY NEWSLMTrER
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A third important constitutional value outlined by Epperson is
the right of the individual "to engage in any of the common occupations of life and to acquire useful knowledge." 47 This right of teachers and students to be free of arbitrary restrictions upon the educational process is secured by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment." Although the Epperson Court decided that it need
not rely upon the broad due process premise which an earlier Court
decision had furnished, 4 the fundamental rights secured in this area
obviously deserve careful examination in the context of the present
controversy over science teaching and textbooks. Finally, Epperson
advances a rule of construction that is helpful in ascertaining legislative purpose: courts should look behind the explicit language of
legislation to determine the law's purpose. The motivation for the
law has probative value,5" and the Court may properly take judicial
notice of the public context within which the contested legislation
was enacted.
The Court in Epperson explored the questions of vagueness and
free speech, but declined to base its holding on either ground. 5' The
Court saw little importance in the uncertainty whether the Arkansas statute prohibited explanation of the theory of evolution at all
or merely forbade teaching it as a fact since under either interpretation of its language the statute could not stand.2 Thus Epperson
does not bode well for recent legislative and administrative proposals that, consistent with present creationist policy, seek not to prohibit the teaching of evolution but rather to prohibit oral or written
representations that the theory of evolution is true or is a scientific
53
fact.
"the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful
to them." 393 U.S. at 107.
47. 393 U.S. at 105 (dictum). Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
48. 393 U.S. at 105.
49. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
50. Id. at 109. See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, U.S....
93 S.Ct. 2821, 2825-26 (1973) ("bare Congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group [i.e., to keep 'hippies' off the food stamp program] cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest").
51. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred with the Court's opinion on establishment grounds
but criticized the Court for exploring the vagueness and free speech questions "only to conclude that these issues need not be decided in this case. In the process of not deciding them,
the Court obscures its otherwise straightfoward holding .

. . ."

393 U.S. at 115. Justices

Black and Stewart wrote separate opinions concurring with the result exclusively on vagueness grounds.
52. Id. at 102-03.
53. See notes 8-13 supra. The semantic differences separating scientists from creationists are of considerable importance. William V. Mayer, Professor of Biology at the University
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It is, of course, possible for a law to have predecessors which are
religious in origin yet avoid the prohibition of the establishment
clause. The Supreme Court recognizes that the function and purpose of legislation may change over time. Thus, after engaging in
the close scrutiny demanded in first amendment cases, the Court
has upheld the Sunday closing laws because they are consistent with
a legitimate, secular state interest to set aside a day of rest and
recreation.5 4 In this light, the creationist effort to support its doctrine on non-religious grounds represents an ostensible attempt to
establish an independent secular interest sufficient to withstand
5
constitutional attack .
2. Effect of the Law.-To avoid the strictures of the establishment clause, legislation must have "a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."" Although the Court failed for a
considerable period to define precisely what it meant by "primary
effect of advancing religion," a recent Supreme Court case has declared that public aid furthers religion when it goes to an institution
whose functions are totally related to religion or when it funds a
religious activity even in a secular setting.57 The issue raised in the
science-teaching and textbook controversy is whether oral or written
of Colorado and Director of the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study has stated that
[flundamentalists use the term theory in describing creation, but they use the term in
a sense entirely different from that used by scientists ....

[I]f
one is to consider a

creation theory seriously, it must be subject to the tests demanded of all scientific
theories. That no such tests have been made, and that none is available for examination,
should be apparent to all. There is no creation theory of course, but rather a religious
belief that is quite outside the realm of scientific investigation.
As further evidence of the misuse of the term theory, there is not a reputable
biologist alive who would not jetison the evolution theory were a better scientific theory
postulated concerning evolution. The fundamentalist's position, however, is the antithesis of that of the scientist. While the theory of evolution was derived from a vast mass
of data and from hypotheses consistently analyzed, the theory of creation is not to be
questioned. There can be no modification of the creation theory regardless of evidence,
for the theory has not been derived from fact; rather it has been postulated, and facts
are now being sought to buttress it.
Mayer, The Nineteenth Century Revisited, THE BIOLoGIcAL SCIENCES CURRICULUM STUDY
NEWSLETTER No. 49, at 8 (1972).
54. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 (1961).
55. See 2 ACTS AND FACTS No. 5, at 1-4 (Institute for Creation Research, 1973) in which
Henry Morris of the Creation Research Society suggests that "evolution is completely inadequate as a scientific theory and that creationism provides a better framework for scientific
interpretation." Id. at 3.
56. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, - U.S.... -,
93 S.Ct. 2955, 2965-66 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon
(Lemon II),

-

U.S..... 93 S. Ct. 2982, 2985 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366

U.S. 420, 453 (1960).
57.

Hunt v. McNair,

-

U.S.

93 S. Ct. 2868, 2873-74 (1973).
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communication regarding the doctrine of spontaneous or special
creation in public school science classes constitutes "religious activity." Several cases respond directly or indirectly to this question.
In School District v. Schempp,58 which invalidated required
Bible reading in the public schools in exercises that are religious in
nature, the Court's decision turned on the pervading religious character of the ceremony involved. 9 Because of the Bible's undisputed
role as an instrument of religion, its reading-whatever version-at
any exercise or ceremony for religious purposes is violative of the
establishment clause." The Court went to great lengths in Schempp
to emphasize that its decision did not prohibit public schools from
using the Bible in their curricula either for nonreligious moral inspiration or for teaching secular subjects." The Court observed that a
study of comparative religion or the history of religion can have an
important role in one's education, agreed that the Bible is worthy
of study for its literary qualities, and concluded that its use is constitutionally permissible when presented in an objective program.2
Although the Bible or Biblical doctrines are constitutionally appropriate in objective courses in religion, literature, or history, their use
in science courses raises serious problems under the establishment
clause. The National Academy of Sciences recently enacted a resolution which declared that the basic precepts of science exclude
resorting to supernatural causes since there are no objective criteria
by which to validate them. The Academy took the position that
science and religion are "mutually exclusive realms of human
thought" and should not be taught together. 3
58. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
59. Id. at 224.
60. Id. The pervading religious character of the ceremony and its sectarian bias is
apparent. The invalidated rule provided "specific permission of the alternative use of the
Catholic Douay version as well as . . .permitting non-attendance at the exercises." In his
able concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan posed the following answer, which might be
dispositive of the Bible-reading issue: "any version of the Bible is inherently sectarian, else
there would be no need to offer a system of rotation or alteration of versions in the first place
.... " Id. at 282. But even with rotation, "smaller sects suffer commensurate discrimination." Another more telling problem is there are "persons in every community-oftenly
deeply devout-to whom any version of the Judaeo-Christian Bible is offensive . . .. [and]
others whose reverence for the Holy Scriptures demands private study or reflection and to
whom public reading or recitation is sacreligious ..
" Id. at 283 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 224-25 (dictum).
62. Id. at 225. "Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of
religion, when presented objectively as a part of a secular program of education, may not be
effected consistently with the First Amendment." Id. But cf. id. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring).
63. Resolution, National Academy of Sciences, Oct. 17, 1972. The National Academy
of Sciences passed this resolution in response to its concern that "the California State Board
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In Board of Education v. Allen, 4 a divided Court held that
providing secular textbooks to parochial schools does not violate the
establishment clause. The Court, however, considered the case in
the narrow procedural context of summary judgment entered on the
pleadings, and the record before it contained no evidence about
particular schools, courses, teachers, or books. 5 The challenged law
had been construed by the Court of Appeals of New York as
" 'merely making available secular textbooks at the request of the
individual student.' "" The Court observed that each book loaned
had to be approved by the public school authorities as a suitable
secular work, and it refused to conclude that those officials who
constantly select books are incapable, absent evidence, to distinguish between religious and secular books. 7 Inferentially, state support of religious textbooks would violate the establishment clause,
although the question of which textbooks are unsuitable for use in
the public schools because of religious content was not presented in
Allen.
In a scathing dissent in Allen, Justice Black contended that
books purchased for use by sectarian schools will serve to further the
views of that religion, regardless of the work's contents."8 Justice
Douglas, in another dissenting opinion, emphasized the critical
function of textbooks in the educational process, distinguishing
books from other school items on the ground that there is "nothing
ideological about a bus.""9 Justice Douglas reasoned that textbooks
are sui generis because
[t]he textbook goes to the very heart of education in a parochial school. It is
the chief, although not solitary, instrumentality for propagating a particular
religious creed or faith .... A parochial school textbook may contain many,
many more seeds of creed and dogma than a prayer."

He found particular difficulty with a textbook loan program beof Education is considering a requirement that all public school science texts give parallel
treatment to the theory of evolution and to special creation." See also Resolution of the
Commission on Science Education of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, supra note 28.
64. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
65. Id. at 248.
66. Id. at 245.
67. Id. at 244-45.
68. Id. at 250, 252 (Black, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 257. Likewise, other instances of constitutionally permissible public assistance to individuals within the framework of religious institutions are distinguishable because
there is "nothing ideological about a school lunch, or a public nurse, or a scholarship."
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Id.
70. Id.
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cause there was no reliable standard by which to distinguish secular
from religious textbooks. This, Justice Douglas believed, flirted with
the obvious constitutional problems of public use or funding of texts
that are "liberally sprinkled with religious vignettes."' Although
the majority in Allen rejected the idea that the secular and religious
training processes in a parochial school are so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public further the teaching of religion, 72 the holding of the case should be limited to the
narrow question before the Court-namely, is there constitutional
infirmity with a state law providing secular textbooks to students
73
attending parochial schools?
Everson v. Board of Education4 provides the cornerstone upon
which modern establishment-clause law rests. In that case a sharply
divided Court held that a New Jersey law providing free public
transportation to children attending parochial schools was supported by an independent, legitimate, secular public purpose and
thus did not violate the establishment clause.7 5 From its review of
the early history out of which the establishment clause arose, the
Everson Court pronounced that
[tihe "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government ....

can pass laws

71. Id. at 260 n.9, 260-61. In a prophetic note justified by recent events, Justice Douglas
explained his fear that
[plowerful religious-political pressures will .. be on the state agencies to provide
the books that are desired ...

[and] .

.

. to obtain approval of what is "proper." For

the "proper" books will radiate the "correct" religious view not only in the parochial
school but in the public school as well.
Id. at 265-66 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 248. But see id. at 262 n.12 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
73. Allen does not address itself to the question of what judicial standard would be
appropriate for distinguishing between secular and religious textbooks. Nonetheless, it is
almost certain that several of the textbooks to which Mr. Justice Douglas made reference
would be constitutionally inappropriate for a publicly funded loan program to parochial
schools or for use in the public schools. Id. at 258 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
74. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Jackson, Rutledge, Frankfurter, and Burton, JJ., dissented).
75. The legislation was upheld because, in the Court's view, it "does no more than
provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely
and expeditiously to and from accredited schools." Although the Everson Court recognized
that the contested New Jersey statute "approaches the verge of ... [the state's constitutional] power," the law was upheld as a secular welfare measure comparable to "such general
services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks" from which parents who send their children to parochial schools likewise
benefit. Id. at 16-18. Although both Justices Black and Douglas sharply dissented in Allen,
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in Everson in which Justice Douglas joined. Justice
Douglas later observed that Everson "seems in retrospect to be out of line with the First
Amendment." Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer one religion over an-

other.

. .

.'

Thus the "denominationally neutral" Regents' prayer in Engle v.
Vitale' was held violative of the establishment clause because it
represented an officially approved religious doctrine. 8 As a result,
neither brevity nor generality can shield a practice or a writing from
the establishment clause. The holding in Engle is clearly traceable
to the doctrine of Everson that a state cannot aid all religions.
The "released time" cases, McCollum v. Board of Education9
and Zorach v. Clauson,8 ' establish that the state lacks the authority
to allow religious instruction in public school classrooms. In Zorach
the released-time program did not offend the establishment clause
because it involved neither -religious instruction in public school
classrooms nor the expenditure of public funds. Conversely, in
McCollum, the released-time program was disapproved because it
provided for the use of tax-supported property for religious instruc81
tion.
2 the Court held that grants to churchIn Tilton v. Richardson,8
related colleges and universities for construction of facilities used
solely for nonreligious purposes does not violate the establishment
clause. The Court unanimously invalidated a section of the Higher
Education Facilities Act of 1963 that would have limited the prohibition on religious use of the structures to twenty years. The crucial
question in Tilton was whether the primary effect of the legislative
program advanced'religion. The Court upheld the federal aid program because it expressed a legitimate secular objective appropriate
for governmental action-namely, that the nation.must assist col-.
leges and universities to accommodate the growing numbers of
youth who desire a highbr education. The record had fully established that there had been no religious- services or symbols in the
76.

330 U.s. at 15.

77. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
78. Id. at 430, 436. In a like vein, neither can the state be "hostile" to religion. Compare
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948) with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
312 (1952). The writer shares the view of Justice Brennan that the distinction which the Court
drew between Zorach and McCollum is "faithful to the function of the establishment clause."
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 261 (Brennan, J., concurring).
79. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
80. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
81. The Court found additionally violative of the establishment clause the state's practice of affording sectarian groups invaluable aid by providing pupils for their religious classes
through the use of the state's compulsory public school machinery. 333 U.S. at 212.
82. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
83. Id. at 679.
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federally financed facilities and that they had been used solely for
nonreligious purposes.Y As in Allen, the Tilton Court refused to
assume that religiosity necessarily permeates the secular education
provided by church-supported schools. The Court observed that "by
their very nature, college and postgraduate courses tend to limit the
opportunities for sectarian influence by virtue of their own internal
disciplines."' ' The opinion appeared to equate respect for the internal discipline of academic courses with academic freedom. 6 The
Court acknowledged that there are significant differences between
the religious aspects of church-related colleges and parochial elementary and secondary schools. College students presumably are
less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination
than younger persons. Further, in contrast to parochial and elementary schools, a high degree of academic freedom characterizes many
church-related colleges. This distinction is illustrated by two parochial school cases, Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist"7 and Sloan v. Lemon (Lemon II), 8 in which the
Court concluded that it was not possible to restrict public fund
usage solely to secular purposes in parochial secondary and elementary schools and held unconstitutional, under the establishment
clause, state assistance in New York and New Jersey to such
religion-oriented institutions. 9 In Hunt v. McNair,9" however, decided the same day as Nyquist and Lemon II, the Court approved
the issuance of state revenue bonds for construction of churchrelated college facilities subject to a prohibition against use for religious purposes.
Tilton, Nyquist, Lemon II, and Hunt thus emphasize the narrowness of the Court's holding in Allen.9 While state assistance for
construction of facilities earmarked exclusively for secular use at
some church-related colleges is permissible,12 six members of the
84. Id. at 680.
85. Id. at 686.
86. Id. This equation must be of little comfort to creationists whose doctrinal efforts
are opposed by the overwhelming weight of academically respectable scientific authority. See
notes 28 and 70 supra and accompanying text.
87. U.S. -,
93 S. Ct. 2955 (1973).
88. U.S. 93 S. Ct. 2982 (1973).
89. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, U.S. at __, 93 S.
Ct. at 2966.
90.
- U.S. -,
93 S. Ct. 2868 (1973).
91. Mr. Justice Powell stressed that Allen related only to "seculartextbooks." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, U.S. at _
93 S. Ct. at 2966.
92. There may be church-related colleges in which religion so permeates the curriculum
that public assistance would be impermissible. The holding in Tilton and in Hunt were based
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present Court have indicated their assent to the proposition that it
is impossible to designate facilities exclusively for secular purposes
in elementary and secondary sectarian schools.93 Just as the Court
had declined to approve public assistance to parochial schools because of their religious orientation, the use of religiously oriented
textbooks in the public schools or the provision of such textbooks
to students in parochial schools would also violate the establishment clause.
Several of the constitutional principles emerging from the
above cases are relevant to the controversy over science teaching
and textbooks. The Court's concern for the greater impressionability of elementary and secondary students and their susceptibility
to religious indoctrination should clearly extend to any case involving the question whether the inclusion of creation doctrine in science
textbooks violates the establishment clause. Moreover, the logic of
the McCollum decision should not be subverted merely by incorporating religious instruction into science classes rather than as a separate study, because state support of religious activities are prohibited "whatever they may be called or whatever form they may
adopt."94
The establishment clause must be given a broad interpretation
in light of its history and the evils at which it was aimed.95 Although
a too-precise quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers would be
futile, modern practices can be measured to determine whether they
"tend to promote that type of interdependence between religion and
state which the First Amendment was designed to prevent."96 The
preservation of civic harmony in a pluralistic nation that has undergone a dramatic change in the religious diversity among the population served by our public schools is a prime example of how historic
values can be supportive of contemporary social needs.97
on substantive evidence in the records which tended to support the Court's assumption that
the church-related colleges involved did, in fact, separate secular and religious components
of education. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 686-87. In Hunt, the Court concluded that
there was no basis on the record to conclude that the "[c]ollege's operations are oriented
significantly towards sectarian rather than secular education." U.S. at -,
93 S. Ct.
at 2874.
93. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, U.S. at_ 93 S.
Ct. at 2966. But see Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 681.
94. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 16 (1947).
95. Id. at 14-15. These evils include the centuries of civil strife in Europe born of efforts
of different sects to maintain religious and political supremacy; punishments for speaking
disrespectfully of ministers, for not attending church, and for expressing nonbelief in approved doctrines; and failure to pay tithes and taxes for church support.
96. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 236-37 (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. See id. at 232-53. The public schools in America serve a "uniquely public function:
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3. Entanglement.-The use of entanglement as an independent measure of constitutionality has generally been related to the
"danger that pervasive modern governmental power will ultimately
intrude on religion." 98 In Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon I),' the Court
invalidated state salary supplements for teachers in Rhode Island
and Pennsylvania elementary and secondary parochial schools because of the comprehensive and continuing state surveillance that
would be required. 00 The decision in Board of Education v. Allen
to allow public secular textbooks in the parochial schools was distinguished -n the ground that whereas the potential of books to inject
religion into secular subjects is ascertainable without a monitoring
system, a teacher's potential is not.'0 '
The Court in Lemon I also expressed its concern about a different and broader entanglement problem "presented by the divisive
political potential of these state programs."'0 2 The Court thought
that many people would vote along religious lines when faced with
these educational questions-one of the evils against which the first
amendment was intended to protect. In other settings, however, the
Court has generally approved construction grants to colleges for
secular buildings against entanglement challenges.0 3 Tax exempthe training of American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist
influences of any sort-an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common
to all American groups and religions." Id. at 241-42.
98. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 620. The Court objected to "[this kind of state
inspection and evaluation of the religious content of a religious organization [which] is
fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution forbids. It is a relationship
pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of church schools and hence of
churches." Id.
99. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
100. 403 U.S. at 619. The Court concluded that "the cumulative impact of the entire
relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between
government and religion." Id. at 614.
101. Id. at 617.
102. Id. at 622. Although Nyquist was decided on the ground that the "challenged
sections have the impermissable [sic] effect of advancing religion," there, too, the Court
expressed its apprehension that the assistance "carries grave potential for entanglement in
the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to religion." U.S. at 93 S.
Ct. at 2976.
103. Hunt v. McNair, U.S. ,93 S. Ct. 2868 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971). The majority in Tilton was influenced by three factors: (1) Many churchrelated colleges permit "a high degree of academic freedom" and the Court, faced with
conflicting allegations and evidence, could reasonably find that the institutions offered secular courses. (2) The aid provided was of a nonideological character. It was for facilities-not
teachers. (3) No continuing regulation and surveillance was required. The government grant
was a one-time, single-purpose construction grant that required
no continuing financial relationships or dependencies, no annual audits, and no government analysis of an institution's expenditures on secular as distinguished from religious
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tions for church property have also been upheld against a challenge
on entanglement grounds." 4
In Lemon I the danger posed by entanglement between religion
and the state lay in the private religious sector. In cases such as
McCollum, on the other hand, and in the controversy over science
teaching and textbooks, the danger zone is in the public sector. Yet
the same bitter fruit is produced regardless of whether the entanglement occurs in the public or the private religious sector.' °5 The danger of intrusions by organized religious and quasi-religious political
groups upon the curriculum of the public schools generates apprehension equal to fears of excessive government direction of church
schools and churches. Political division along religious lines-with
its attending threat to the normal political process-is as inherent
in the entanglement of religion in the public schools as in the entanglement of public policies in church schools and, hence, churches
themselves.'06
B.

The Free Exercise Clause

The free exercise and establishment clauses forbid two quite
different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The purpose of the free exercise clause is "to secure religious
liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by
civil authority,"'0 ° and its violation is predicated on coercion.0 8 To
activities. Inspection as to use is a minimal contact.
403 U.S. at 686-88. The Tilton Court concluded that although "[n]o one of these three factors
standing alone is necessarily controlling," cumulatively they were dispositive. Id. at 688.
104. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970). The court was obviously influenced
by the continuous practice of exemption that "covers our entire national existence and indeed
predates it." Id. at 678. Justice Brennan concurred because he believed exemptions are
supported by at least two legitimate secular interests: (1) Churches are merely "among a
range of other private, nonprofit organizations [that] contribute to the well-being of the
community in a variety of nonreligious ways" and (2) the exemptions contribute to the
"diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprises essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society." Id. at 687-89.
105. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 259 (Brennan, J., concurring):
"[Glovernment and religion have discrete interests which are mutually best served when
each avoids too close a proximity to the other. It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the
injection of sectarian doctrines and controveries into the civil polity, but in as high degree it
is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply
involved with and dependent upon the government."
106. In some areas, especially those that are rural and relatively homogeneous, the
judicial disestablishment of religion in the public schools has itself generated substantial
political fallout. See, e.g., R. Mykkeltvedt, Response of Georgia'sPublic School Systems to
the School Prayer Decisions: "Whipping a Dead Horse," 9 GA. ST. B.J. 425 (1973).
107. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
108. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 430.
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determine the constitutionality of state action that allegedly impinges upon the free exercise of religion, the courts resort to a balancing process in which the interests of the state are weighed in
relation to other fundamental rights and interests that may be affected. Only those interests of primary importance that cannot be
otherwise served can overbalance the free exercise of religion." 9 The
free exercise of religion actually has a dual character: it prevents the
state from compelling the acceptance of any creed or practice, thus
allowing the individual freedom of choice in his beliefs, while at the
same time it protects the practice of any religion that an individual
does choose to believe. This part of the first amendment involves
both the right to believe, which is absolute, and the freedom to act,
which in a pluralistic society is not."0 The free exercise question
arises in two different contexts in the controversy over science
teaching and textbooks in the public schools. First, is the doctrine
of spontaneous or special creation a non-scientific, religious doctrine
the teaching or study of which could not constitutionally be required
by the state in science courses? Secondly, does opposition to the
teaching or study of evolution, if grounded upon sincere religious
belief, provide a basis for the exemption of students from compulsory science or biology classes?"'
It is well settled that the free exercise clause is violated by
state-imposed prayers" 2 or Bible reading 3 in the public schools
because of the religious character of these practices. Nor may a state
require an applicant for public office to swear or affirm a belief in a
deity, because such a religious test "unconstitutionally invades the
appellant's freedom of belief and religion.""' In Torcaso v.
Watkins,"5 the Court repeated and reaffirmed what it had said in
two earlier cases" 6-that neither a state nor federal government can
constitutionally force a person to believe or disbelieve in any religion." ' State legislation to require consideration of Biblical or religious explanations of creation in the science curricula of public
109. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972).
110. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
111. Standing would present no problem in either context. See School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9.
112. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
113. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
114. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961).
115. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
116. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
117. 367 U.S. at 495.
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schools raises substantial questions under the free exercise clause,
and any student or faculty membef whose religious freedoms were
infringed would have standing to challenge such legislation.', 8 The
place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be denied, and
Biblical or other divine explanations of creation engrafted upon the
science curricula of the public schools assume a religious function
of the character disapproved in Schempp, Engel, and McCollum.
Also, whatever legitimate state interest there may be in acquainting
students with Biblical or other divine explanations of creation can
be served by other means that do not offend the free exercise clause,
as, for example, when such explanations are presented objectively
in a course on the sociology of religion, history of religion, or comparative religion.'
The teaching of the doctrine of special or spontaneous creation
apart from any Biblical referents may likewise offend the free exercise clause. Special creation is a supernatural doctrine that presupposes a creator the existence of which is empirically unverifiable. 2"
Because acceptance of the doctrine of special creation must be a
matter of faith, it is a religiousdoctrine the teaching of which in the
public schools presents insurmountable obstacles under both the
free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment.
Allegations of fundamentalist parents that the teaching of evolution to their children violates their fundamental parental rights
and their freedom of conscience present a claim that, in the opinion
of this writer, raises equally substantial questions under the free
exercise clause. In Board of Education v. Schempp, the Court was
confronted with a claim that unless religious exercises are permitted
a "religion of secularism" would be established in the schools.1 2'
Although the phrase "religion of secularism" may be a semantic red
herring, the claim raises far more difficult problems in the present
context than it did in Schempp. There, the Court agreed that the
state may not prefer those who believe in no religion by openly
opposing or being hostile to religion generally, but held that the
decision did not have that effect. 12 One may agree with the holding
in Schempp that the state is precluded under the establishment
clause from adopting practices of a religious character in order to
avoid the charge that it has established a religion of secularism in
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See note 111 supra.
See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
See note 28 and the text accompanying note 64 supra.
School Dist v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
Id.
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the schools. The acceptance of that proposition, however, is by no
means dispositive of a sincere claim by fundamentalist parents
based upon religious beliefs that the study of the theory of evolution
by their children violates their fundamental parental rights "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. 1 3 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,124 the Court invalidated state
legislation that would have deprived parents of the right to send
their children to private rather than public schools. If there is no
general state power to standardize children by forcing them to
accept instruction exclusively from public teachers, then it is likewise reasonable to contend that there is no state power to force
children attending the public schools into a common mold, especially where delicate claims arising under the free exercise clause are
presented.'2 Several other Supreme Court cases support this posi2
tion.
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,127 the
Court in a three-judge plurality opinion invalidated legislation compelling a salute and pledge of allegiance to the American flag on the
grounds that the ceremony overstepped constitutional limitations
on state power and invaded the sphere of the intellect that is protected from official control by the first amendment. 2 8 In their concurring opinion, Justices Black and Douglas observed that the purpose of the first amendment is to "permit the widest toleration of
conflicting viewpoints consistent with a society of free men.' ' 29 The
justices viewed the ceremony, when enforced against conscientious
objections, as merely a disguised form of religious persecution.13
123. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1924). Compare Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 113-14 (Black, J., concurring).
124. 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
125. Conversely, it would appear that a certain amount of "standardization" of course
content is necessary in most schools, especially in order to make possible comparative assessments of student performance.
126. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
127. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
128. Id. at 642. The Barnette plurality reasoned that "lilt is not necessary to inquire
whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute unless we first find power
to make the salute a legal duty." Id. at 635. Query whether the plurality opinion in Barnette
is based upon the free exercise clause, the free speech clause, or both, or neither? Cf. Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). However, three members of the Barnette Court did reach
the free exercise question. 319 U.S. at 643-44 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring); id. at 64446 (Murphy, J., concurring).
129. 319 U.S. at 644.
130. "Neither our domestic tranquility in peace nor our martial effort in war depend
on compelling little children to participate in a ceremony which ends in nothing for them but
a fear of spiritual condemnation. If, as we think their fears are groundless, time and reason
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In another concurrence in Barnette, Justice Murphy declared
that governmental compulsion to affirm what is contrary to one's
religious beliefs "isthe antithesis of freedom of worship . . . "3 By
the same rationale, it could be contended that the free exercise
clause would be violated by compelling students to study science
texts presenting data that tends to support the theory of evolution,
if the effect of such study is to interfere with or destroy belief in
religious doctrine inculcated in the home or the church.'32 Religious
beliefs founded upon a literal interpretation of verses 1-11 of Genesis
that the earth was created in seven days or that the Noachian flood
was an historic event are deserving of as much protection as the
beliefs which were protected in Barnette. 33 Most people in this
country who subscribe to religious beliefs have developed beliefsystems that are either compatible with, or are preserved in a sphere
of the mind apart from, the data, hypotheses, theories, and laws of
science. The study of evolution in the public schools raises no free
exercise questions for them or their children. For a minority of fundamentalists, however, the study of evolution interferes with their
freedom to act in accordance with their sincere religious belief.'3 In
Wisconsin v. Yoder 3 5 the Court exempted Amish children between
the ages of fourteen and sixteen years who had completed the eighth
grade and were participating in a program of informal vocational
education from an otherwise lawful and generally applicable requirement that children attend school until age sixteen. The study
of evolution by certain children of fundamentalist parents may, as
in Yoder, carry with it the danger of censure by the church
are the proper antidotes for their errors. The ceremonial, when enforced against conscientious
objections . . . is a handy implement for disguised religious persecution." Id.
131. Id. at 646 (Murphy, J., concurring).
132. On the other hand, Barnette may be distinguishable on the ground that the act of
saluting the flag was repulsive whereas in a science course the student is not forced to believe
as true anything which he studies. If the student cannot accommodate his or his parents'
religious views with the theory of evolution, as most students do, he is free to reject personally
the theory of evolution for whatever reasons he wishes since the right to believe or think is
absolutely protected under the first amendment.
133. The challenging parties in Barnette were Jehovah's Witnesses, who "are an unincorporated body teaching that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of
laws enacted by temporal government. Their religious beliefs include a literal version of
Exodus, Chapter 20, verses 4 and 5, which says: 'Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven

image.

. .

thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them.' They consider that the

flag is an 'image' within this command. For this reason they refuse to salute it." 319 U.S. at
629.
134. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). The majority in Yoder thought that
the "convincing showing . . . [of the Amish was] one that probably few other religious
groups or sects could make . . . ." Id. at 235-36.
135. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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community and threat to the salvation of parents and children.'36
The Court in Yoder recognized the values of parental direction
of the religious education of their children in their formative years' 7
and found that the traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children can outweigh even the strong
state interest in universal education, provided that parents adequately prepare their children for added responsibilities.3 8 There
may be parents who as a result of deep religious conviction feel
themselves as much threatened by the children's study of evolution
as the Amish felt threatened by the compulsory attendance law. Is
the justification for "hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards""' any less in the case of the fundamentalist parent who on religious grounds objects to the study of evolution than
in the case of the Amish parent who on similar grounds objects to
compulsory education beyond the eighth grade? Perhaps the social
policy most consistent with the free exercise and establishment
clauses would permit exemptions from science courses, or portions
thereof, for children whose parents request that their children be
excused on religious grounds. The curtailment of employment and
earnings potential, educational opportunities, and attainable life
style of children excused from biology or science classes is not nearly
so drastic as for those who do not go beyond the eighth grade. Such
exemptions or excusals could forestall political efforts by fundamentalists to compromise the academic integrity of science textbooks
and would depoliticize the present controversy. If accommodation
with the interests of fundamentalist parents could be realized by
excusing their children from some or all science classes, then the
establishment and free exercise claims asserted by the majority to
be free of creation doctrine in science teaching and textbooks-claims that are of equal or greater weight in this instance-could perhaps be avoided altogether.
Two problems remain, however. School attendance and enroll136. Id. at 209.
137. Id. at 213-14. Cf. Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). In Ginsburg the Court upheld a statute prohibiting sale
of obscene materials to minors under seventeen years of age on grounds that it was supportive
of the "consistently recognized. . . parents' claim . . . to direct the rearing of their children
[which] is basic in the structure of our society." 390 U.S. at 639. In Meyer, the Court found
a parental duty to give his children an education suitable to their social position in life.
138. 406 U.S. at 214. "The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as
an enduring American tradition." Id. at 232.
139. Id. at 217.
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ment in the prescribed science curriculum involve not only the freedom to believe, which is absolute, but the freedom to act, which
may be lawfully circumscribed by the state.' Also, a state has a
legitimate interest not only in developing the talents of its young,
but also in preparing them for the lifestyle that they may choose or
have the option to choose later in life.' Justice Douglas dissented
in Yoder because he thought that the decision imperilled the student's future, not the parents'. He insisted that while parents
usually speak for the whole family, on such a vital matter as education, the child may have views and ought to be heard.4 2 The majority in Yoder insisted that its decision in no way determined possible
competing interests of parents and children since the record did not
present such an issue in that case.'43 The child-oriented position
acknowledged by Justices Stewart and Brennan and insisted upon
by Justice Douglas is persuasive, however. In a matter such as education, there may be instances when the wishes of the child, especially as the child grows older, ought to prevail even over the parens
patriae and free exercise claims of the parent. The Court in Yoder
admitted that the "power of the parent, even when linked to a free
exercise claim, may be subject to limitation . . . if it appears that
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child,
or have a potential for significant social burdens."' 44 Cases involving
declared adverse interests between parents and minor children over
educational opportunity and free exercise matters raise extremely
difficult questions that are left unsettled by Yoder.
I.

ACADEMIC DUE PROCESS

Although the establishment and free exercise clauses represent
the most formidable constitutional barrier to creationist efforts to
rewrite the science textbooks used in the nation's public schools and
140. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
141. Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. at 240 (Stewart and Brennan, JJ., concurring). The
question in Yoder was considered "close" by Justices Stewart and Brennan. Id.
142. Id. at 244 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Justice Douglas favored reserving
decision until the views of the Amish children in question could be canvassed on remand by
the Wisconsin courts. Id. at 246.
143. Id. at 231.
144. Id. at 233-34. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Prince, the
Court upheld a statute forbidding boys under eighteen years of age from selling magazines
in the streets against a claim based upon parental power over the child and the alleged
infringement of the right of free exercise of religion by Jehovah's Witnesses whose children
distributed religious literature in the streets. Parents, the Court suggested, should not be
allowed "to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves." Id. at 170.
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to win equal time for creationist doctrine in science teaching, the
controversy also involves substantial claims of academic due process that deserve exploration.
A.

The Free Speech Clause

The free speech guarantee of the first amendment has long been
recognized as one of the "fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States."'45 Although control over the public
school curriculum is, like public education generally, committed to
the control of state and local authorities, ' the first amendment
"does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.""117 Academic freedom is a particular concern of the first
amendment because of its "transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned."' 4 In Keyishian v. Board of
4 as in most other loyalty cases, the first amendment has
Regents,"'
been invoked to protect speech and associational activities of teachers outside of the classroom. A fortiori, speech inside the classroom
on matters within the professional competence of the teacher deserves protection as well.' 50
In the leading case on student constitutional rights, Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District,'5 ' the Court
observed that
First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' 52

Thus the right of students protesting the Vietnam war to wear black
armbands while in school was approved as symbolic speech within
145. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
146. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,51 &n.108 (1973).
147. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (invalidating New York's
Feinberg Law).
148. Id. Unwarranted inhibitions upon teachers "chill that free play of the spirit which
all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice." Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
195 (1952) (Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
149. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
150. See American Association of University Professors, Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure, printed in HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN AsSOCIATION OF UNIVERsrY PRoFEssoRs, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 33 (G. Joughin ed. 1967). "The teacher

is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he should be careful not
to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to this subject
." Id. at 35-36. See also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
151. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
152. Id. at 506.
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the right of students to "personal intercommunication."' 5 3 Regulations impinging upon rights of personal intercommunication among
students can be justified only when school officials can demonstrate
that the activities would materially disrupt the work and discipline
5
of the school. 1
In Shelton v. Tucker'5 5 the Court invalidated an Arkansas statute that required teachers in public schools to file as a prerequisite
to employment affidavits giving the names and addresses of all
organizations to which they had belonged or contributed within the
preceding five years. Of course, a state has the right to investigate
the competence and fitness of those it hires to teach in its schools.'5
But although the governmental purpose was both legitimate and
substantial in Shelton, the Court overturned the statute because its
purpose could have been achieved by less drastic means. The decision suggests several observations pertinent to the controversy over
science teaching and textbooks. It is difficult to define a state purpose behind creationist legislation that is either legitimate or substantial. Such legislation certainly is not prompted by a compelling
state interest of the magnitude necessary to justify restrictions upon
intellectual freedom. Also, the plaintiffs in Shelton included public
secondary school teachers as well as a college teacher, in contrast
to most of the loyalty cases which primarily have involved only
college teachers.'57 The proposition that nowhere is the protection of
constitutional freedoms more vital than in the schools is also applicable, therefore, at the secondary and elementary levels as well as at
the college level.'58
153. Id. at 512. The Court found it "relevant that the school authorities did not purport
to prohibit the wearing of all symbols of political or controversial significance." Id. at 510.
154. Id. at 513. The undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance by school
officials is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Id. at 508; cf. Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F.
Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
155. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
156. Id. at 485. In Adler v. Board of Educ., the Court recognized that because the
teacher "shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live" the
schoolroom is a "sensitive area" in which the state has a vital concern. 342 U.S. at 485, 493
(1952).
157. Id. at 482-84.
158. Id. at 487. There are 2 schools of thought on whether the guarantees of the free
speech clause should be extended to teachers and students in the public schools. This writer
believes that recognition of academic freedom within the context of professional responsibility
is the concept best suited to quality education in a free society. See Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). But see Mailloux v. Kiley, 323
F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 1045, 1053 (1968), where it was suggested, on the
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Application of the free speech clause of the first amendment to
the public school classroom can satisfy the important societal goal
of making the classroom a market place of ideas.'5 9 The primary
function of the public school should be to encourage students to
develop an appropriate methodology for engaging in intellectual
inquiry.10 The method of inquiry appropriate to the science class is,
of course, the scientific method. For the state to compel the science
or biology teacher to devote classroom time to the explanation of
creation doctrine derived non-scientifically by revelation, authority,
or induction is an egregious abuse of the teacher's freedom of
speech. The state has a legitimate interest in requiring that the
science or biology teacher cover the subject in a professionally acceptable manner. Dismissal for the teacher's failure to perform in a
professionally acceptable manner in the classroom is unquestionably the right of the state, and in this sense, government may properly regulate the classroom speech of the teacher. But this governmental right should be limited to action that reasonably advances
the legitimate interest of the state to assure that the classroom
performance of the teacher is professionally acceptable.' 6 '
basis of what this writer thinks are highly questionable, authoritarian assumptions, that the
"free speech clause of the first amendment ... is of questionable relevance to speech in
public elementary or secondary classrooms." A school should not be like a hospital or a jail.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. at 512 n.6. See also
Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
159. The emerging legal rights of teachers to academic freedom have been discussed by
Fellman, Academic Freedom in American Law, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 3; Murphy, Academic
Freedom-An Emerging ConstitutionalRight, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoa. 447 (1963); Van
Alstyne, The ConstitutionalRights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841; Wright,
The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969); Comment, Academic Freedom-Its Constitutional Context, 40 U. CoLo. L. REV. 600 (1968); 55 MARQ. L. REv. 379
(1972).
160. The philosopher Charles Peirce defined inquiry as the "irritation of doubts [that]
causes a struggle to attain a state of belief." He was convinced that "[w]hen doubt ceases,
mental action on the subject comes to an end." He urged the superiority of the method of
science over the methods of tenacity, authority, and induction for discovering matters of
"external permanency." See Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, in CLASSIC AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHERS 55, 60-61, 66 (M. Fisch ed. 1951). Cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. at
262-63 (Frankfurter & Harlan, JJ., concurring).
161. Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), aff'd, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966), is not contrary to the position urged above. In
Parker, the probationary contract of a high school psychology teacher was not renewed,
apparently because he had assigned a book as requiredreading from a county optionalreading
list that had cautioned, among other things, that the "maturity of the student" should be
considered in making assignments. The district court stated that the school system had the
right to expect the teacher to exercise the discretion urged in the caution on the reading list.
237 F. Supp. at 229. The court of appeals excluded the constitutional questions and affirmed
per curiam solely "on the contract" which was probationary and could be terminated with
30 days notice at the end of the first or the second school year. 348 F.2d at 465.
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The freedom of elementary and secondary teachers to speak in
a professionally responsible manner in the classroom enhances other
important social values as well. A substantial portion of the nation's
young people do not attend college. For many of these students, the
public schools will offer the only institutional opportunity to develop critical intellectual skills. For students who do attend college,
the social interest in the freedom of classroom inquiry is equally
important. To lay the proper foundation in science or biology for
these students requires elementary and secondary teachers who are
secure in their right to inquire and to explain matters in a professionally responsible manner. The usefulness of the theory of evolution to explain and to organize empirical data cannot seriously be
questioned. The biology or science teacher's interest in communicating concepts that are commonly regarded as valid by the scientific community constitutes preferred speech whose social value
should effectively insulate it against any conceivable state interest.
Although the techniques that can be used by teachers to stimulate intellectual inquiry may vary considerably with classroom level,
the constantly questioning, nonindoctrinative pedagogy that perhaps characterizes good teaching at any level needs the breathing
space afforded by the free speech clause. Limiting the accountability of the teacher for classroom speech to extra-constitutional standards of professonal acceptability would seem to be especially important at the secondary and elementary school levels because the
guild concepts of academic freedom and tenure do not provide
nearly so much protection there as at the university level.16 2 The
probability of political interference and the injection of community
prejudice would appear greater at the public school level than at the
college level, and thus the corresponding need for greater protection
of first amendment freedoms. The resolution of disputes between
teachers and school administrators over the content of classroom
speech should be resolved in the vast majority of cases without
resort to the judicial process as a result of negotiation or access to
administrative hearings. Courts do not and should not interfere in
conflicts that arise in the daily operation of school systems and do
not sharply implicate basic constitutional values. The problems
raised by judicial interposition in the operation of the public school
system call for restraint.'6 3 On the other hand, the courts should be
available to redress clear abuses of administrative discretion. Al162.
163.

See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 685-86.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 104.
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though the task of establishing a judicially manageable standard of
professionally acceptable classroom conduct is difficult, the task is
not insurmountable; comparable standards are regularly applied by
the courts in professional malpractice and other tort cases." 4
B.

Rational Basis

The earliest cases decided by the Court on the "impact of constitutional guarantees upon the classroom were decided before the
Court expressly applied the specific prohibitions of the First
Amendment to the States."' 65 But as early as 1923, the Court decided Meyer v. Nebraska'" and Bartels v. Iowa,'7 invalidating, "oh
due process grounds, state legislation that prohibited the teaching
of any modern foreign language below the eighth grade level. The
Epperson Court's apparent belief that Meyer and Bartels were decided on substantive due process grounds probably influenced the
disposition of Epperson on establishment grounds, enabling it to
avoid re-entering "the difficult terrain which the Court, in 1923,
traversed without apparent misgivings.""' Much of the language in
Meyer suggests a substantive due process rationale based upon a
fundamental right of persons to pursue a useful occupation without
unreasonable interference.' 9 Although the decision in Meyer declared that the right to pursue one's occupation and hence the right
to teach was within the liberty of the fourteenth amendment, the
Court did not apply a strict scrutiny standard in evaluating the
state's interest in the law. Meyer held that a statute is void under
the due process clause if it is "arbitrary and without reasonable
relation to any end within the competency of the State."1 0
The courts have properly declined to invalidate state laws that
164. Cf. Cowan, Interference with Academic Freedom:The Pre-NatalHistory of a Tort,
4 WAYNE L. REv. 205 (1958).
165. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 105.
166. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
167. 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
168. 393 U.S. at 105. One reason that the Court declined to take advantage of the broad
premise of Meyer may be attributed to the Court's reluctance to invite "justiciability of the
multitude of controversies which beset our [college] campuses" in the mid- and late-sixties.
Id. at 106.
169. In Meyer, the Court recognized as fundamental the rights to teach and to learn,
and it declared that the state lacks authority "materially to interfere with the calling of
modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with
the power of parents to control the education of their own." 262 U.S. at 401. But cf. Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. at 519-20 (Black, J., dissenting). Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483 (1955).
170. 262 U.S. at 403.
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regulate business and industrial conditions because they may be
imprudent or out of step with a particular school of thought. In
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,'7" the Court found the due process
claim unpersuasive because there was a rational relation between
the law and a legitimate state objective.'
The Court's holding,
however, leaves open the possibility of overturning on due process
grounds legislation that has no rational relation to any state objective.
The claim of the teacher on occupational grounds to transmit
knowledge established within a discipline is supported by the decision in Meyer. The same result, however, can be reached more easily
on free speech grounds. State legislation requiring the inclusion of
academically irrelevant materials impinges upon teachers' rights of
speech secured by the due process clause. The fact that the right of
the individual to pursue a useful occupation has long been recognized as an interest of basic importance in our society' might suggest the appropriateness of a strict scrutiny standard, especially in
view of the confluence of occupational and free speech rights. Since
education is generally recognized as a basic interest of society, occupational rights essential to the educational process-the right, for
example, of the teacher to organize a biology course that includes
evolution free from state requirements incorporating religious or
other extraneous doctrines-are especially deserving of protection.
In Boddie v. Connecticut,' the Court invalidated fee and cost
requirements in divorce actions for persons unable to pay costs by
reason of their poverty. The Court weighed the state's asserted interest in the fee and cost system as a mechanism of resource allocation or cost recoupment against the need for access by persons seeking divorces to the only forum empowered to settle their disputes
and concluded that, on balance, the state failed to establish a governmental interest sufficient to outweigh the individual right to
adjust a human relationship.'75 Although Boddie doubtless reflected
the Court's concern with procedural due process, it is significant
that Meyer was approvingly cited as a source of "interests of basic
171. 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
172. Id. at 491.
173. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399, where the Court cited 14 previous Supreme Court decisions as authority for its conclusion that "the right of the individual. . . to
engage in any of the common occupations of life . . . [and] to acquire useful knowledge. ..
[are] essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
174. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
175. Id. at 376-77, 383.
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importance in our society.' ' 7 Nor does the application of Meyer
urged here offend the present Court's penchant for restraint in the
delineation and vindication of fundamental liberties. 17 7 Arguably,
the right to teach and the right to learn in the context in which these
rights would be asserted in the science teaching and textbook controversy are implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. The science
teaching and textbook controversy involves legislation that
"'deprive[s],' 'infringe[s],' or 'interfere[s]' with the free exercise
of . . . [a] fundamental personal right or liberty.' ' 78 The asserted
right is that of the science or biology teacher to speak free from
arbitrary legislation that unreasonably imposes upon him the burden of providing equal time for nonscientific doctrines bearing no
reasonable relation to his discipline. The thrust of the science or
biology teacher's claim is not of the "affirmative and reformatory"
type that is regarded with disapproval by the present majority on
the Court.'79 Even if the right of the teacher to speak were not
considered fundamental in the sense that state interference with the
right is deserving of special scrutiny, state interference with science
teaching would still be subject to the traditional due process requirement that all state legislation must bear some reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest.
The right of the student to acquire useful knowledge is likewise
a recognized basic interest deserving of protection under the due
176. Id. at 376; Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
at 506. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Court cited Pierce
and Meyer approvingly and observed that the state "may not, consistently with the spirit of
the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge." Id. at 482 (dictum).
The Court could hold that academic freedom is a penumbral right emanating from the free
speech clause comparable to the right of privacy recognized in Griswold. In the context of
the controversy of science teaching and textbooks, the question would become whether the
state can compel the inclusion of doctrines in an academic discipline when there is no rational
relationship between the inclusion and any legitimate state interest. It stands to reason that
what the state may not arbitrarily contract it may not arbitrarily expand.
177. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-39. Five
members of the present Court are opposed to the extension of the fundamental rights rationale employed in the Court's equal protection decisions. I4. at 30-31. The Court's caveat that
"'[vlirtually every state statute affects important rights'" coupled with its apprehensions
of becoming a "super-legislature" explain the prevailing policy of restraint. Id. at 31, citing
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Presumably, this mood of
restraint and deference to legislative authority and competence would apply with equal force
to the due process cases.
178. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 38.
179. Id. at 39. See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970). It would appear that the judicially disfavored "affirmative and reformatory" claims-at least in civil matters-are simply the ones that cost money i.e., claims that
would result in judicial intervention in resource allocation, a peculiarly legislative function.
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process clause.' 0 To require a student to study material that has no
reasonable relationship to the academic course he is pursuing appears arbitrary and unrelated to any legitimate state interest. The
state interest in prescribing a school curriculum is admittedly both
legitimate and substantial, and the competence of the judiciary in
matters of educational policy is slight. This suggests that judicial
review of school curriculum policy' should be exercised very rarely
and with great restraint. It could not be contended seriously, however, that students would be unable to challenge on due process
grounds state policies that are arbitrary and bear no reasonable
relationship'to any legitimate state interest.''
C.

Vagueness

It is well established that a statute that "leaves an ordinary
man so doubtful about its meaning that he cannot know when he
has violated it denies the first essential of due process."'' 2 Two Justices thought that vagueness was dispositive of the Eppersoncase.1ss
Standards of permissible statutory vagueness are "strict in the area
of free expression."' 84 If the line drawn between permitted and prohibited activities is an ambiguous one, the courts will not presume
that the statute only mimimally interferes with constitutionally
protected activity. 8 5 Where first amendment freedoms are concerned, the objectional quality of vagueness and overbreadth do not
depend upon inadequate notice or improper delegation of legislative
authority, but only upon an act's susceptibility to improper application so.as to infringe upon individual freedoms.' 6
180. See note 168 supra.
181. Suppose, for example, that the state required that all students in eighth-grade
English, as a condition precedent to successful completion of the course, successfully make 3
parachute jumps from an altitude of at least 5,000 feet. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639, where the Court stressed the importance of distinguishing
between the due process clause "as an instrument for transmitting the principles of the First
Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own sake." Compare Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331-32 (1921) with Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488
(1955).
182. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 112 (Black, J., concurring).
183. Justice Black thought that the Arkansas statute was vague because "a teacher
cannot know whether he is forbidden to mention Darwin's theory at all or only free to discuss
it as long as he refrains from contending that it is true." Id. Justice Stewart thought that the
statute was vague because it was unclear whether Arkansas had forbidden teachers to mention Darwin's theory at all. Id. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
184. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 433. "Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely
touching our most precious freedoms." Id. at 438.
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Several recent cases have extended procedural protections to
protect the classroom speech of teachers from interference by vague
regulations."" Generally, these cases have involved situations in
which teachers have used techniques 'or language or made assignments considered obscene 88 or inappropriate. 18 State legislation affecting science teaching and textbook selection would likewise be
subject to review, although it is unsettled as to whether strict scrutiny should be used. 9"
IV.

CONCLUSION

How subjects are to be taught in the public schools, which
textbooks are to be used, and howothey are to be edited are questions
that traditionally have been resolved quietly within *theframework
of the educational system. Recent efforts by religious fundamentalists to win equal time for creatiofi doctrines in science textbooks,
however, should remind us of the delicate, highly vulnerable first
amendment rights that are exposed in the process of selecting and
editing textbooks for use in public schools. This paper has considered at length the constitutional implications of the creationist efforts, and the degree to which the recently enacted Tennessee statute and the California selection guidelines-as well as the plethora
of similar proposed legislation-are subject to attack on first and
fourteenth amendment grounds.'9 '
187. Dunham v. Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177 (1st Cir. 1970); Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d 945
(5th Cir. 1970); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); MailIoux v. Kiley, 323 F.
Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971). See also Quarterman v. Byrd,
453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971) (students afforded procedural due process concerning school
policies on the distribution of printed materials). Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 357
F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (student teacher who discussed Darwinian theory in seventh
grade history class entitled to hearing prior to termination).
188. E.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 487 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387
(D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D.
Ala. 1970).
189. E.g., Downs v. Conway School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
190. See, e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1391 n.4 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d
1242 (Ist Cir. 1971). It is highly questionable whether recent Tennessee legislation, supra note
8, could survive such a review on vagueness grounds. For example, the statute fails to define
many key terms, including "theory," "scientific fact," "opinion," "occult or satanical beliefs
of human origin," and "reference work." Moreover, the statute fails to specify which theories
other than the Genesis account-or even which Genesis account-must be treated in the
public textbooks, or whether the several theories must be included only in biology textbooks
or in all textbooks. Finally, the act leaves open whether it applies to biology teaching or just
to biology textbooks, and whether state-supported colleges and universities are included as
well as the elementary and secondary schools.
191. That both the present Tennessee legislation, supra note 8, and the California
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To win equal time for creation doctrine in science and biology
texts, the fundamentalist movement has risen phoenix-like from the
ashes of Epperson. It will probably be consumed once again by the
establishment clause, although individual students may well be
excused from science and biology classes, or portions thereof, under
the free exercise rationale of Yoder. But the continuing problems of
assuring the integrity of the vast state administrative systems that
regulate the flow of textbooks and knowedge to children in the public schools will remain with us for a long time. Only judicial insistance on reasonably ascertainable standards of selection and appropriate procedural safeguards to secure the right of review can forestall the governmental control of the flow of ideas that the first
amendment was intended to prohibit.
science curriculum guidelines, supranotes 5-7 and accompanying text, under which textbooks
are currently being edited, violate the establishment and free exercise cluases is evident. The
sectarian purpose of the Tennessee act is apparent both on its face and from the context of
its enactment. The impetus for the bill appears to have come from Russell Artist, a professor
at the Church of Christ-affiliated David Lipscomb College and one of the contributors to the
creationist text, supra note 4. Gillem, Prof's Textbook Campaign Led to Genesis Bill, The
Tennessean (Nashville), Apr. 30, 1973, at 1, col. 7. Mr. Artist has tried in vain on several
occasions to get the Tennessee Textbook Commission to adopt his text. Id. at 7, col. 5. The
House bill was handled by Rep. Tommy Burnett, a sometimes Church of Christ lay speaker.
The Tennessean (Nashville), Apr. 27, 1973, at 3, col. 1. The bill was passed in the Senate
without debate and with only one dissenting vote, but the House debates plainly disclose the
sectarian purpose and implications of the bill as well as its probable effect in the advancement of religion. See also The Chattanooga Times, Apr. 27, 1973, at 2, col. 1; id., Apr. 19,
1973, at 2, col. 4. Audio tapes on the debate of the bill in the House of Representatives strongly
reinforce the bill's sectarian purpose and probable effect of advancing religion. See Audio
Tapes of Debate on S.B. 394, April 18 and 30, 1973 in Tennessee State Library and Archives,
Nashville, Tennessee.
The author of the two disputed paragraphs in the California science curriculum guidelines was Vernon Grose, whom Gov. Ronald Reagan of California has subsequently appointed
to the California Board of Education Curriculum Commission. Mr. Grose disclosed in a recent
interview:
[M]y citizenship really is in heaven. And even though I wasn't trained in biology, when
I got into the issue I believe I must have felt something like Jesus did when he overthrew
the tables and the moneychangers in the temple ...
The odds were extremely high against success. Yet I believe because my trust was in
the Lord and because the issue was a significant one, that He honored the effort.
When I received the invitation . . . to appear before the Board of Education I felt quite
inadequate. As I mentioned, my discipline is physics while the subject involved biology.
So I requested the elders of the church which I attended to set me apart for this task,
just as in apostolic times men were set apart by the church for a specific ministry. You
will remember this is recorded in the 13th chapter of Acts as happening in the church
at Antioch.
I believe we must ask God to give us an annointing of the Holy Spirit to confront
the forces of evil. . . . Not simply to withstand their attack, but to attack them. And if
I sound excited, I guess I am.
Bredesen, Anatomy of a Confrontation(An Interview with Vernon L. Grose), J. OF AM. Sc.
AFFILIATION 146, 147-48 (Dec. 1972) (emphasis added).

